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INSTITUTIONALISING THE WIDER EUROPE 
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 42/OCTOBER 2003 
MICHAEL EMERSON
∗ 
SUMMARY 
The Wider Europe has now become a prominent feature in European foreign policy 
discourse, prompted by the need for the enlarging EU to define its future relations with the 
rest of Europe and the arc of Arab-Islamic states to its south and east. The EU’s first policy 
documents on this subject, however, have been thin in substance, mainly seeking to develop 
more active bilateral relations with countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. Yet at the same 
time the EU is discussing bilaterally just with Russia a set of common European policy 
spaces that should be at the heart of a Wider Europe policy. It is therefore argued in this 
paper that the EU should adopt a systematic approach to defining a complete set of seven 
common European policy spaces, with multilateral institutional developments to match, thus 
bringing together the bilateral and multilateral approaches. The overarching institutional 
mechanism should be through transforming the present very weak ‘European Conference’ 
into a seriously structured ‘Pan-European Conference’, led by a Coordinating Group 
consisting of the EU, Russia and a few other rotating places for non-EU states, with 
institutionalised linkages to the Council of Europe and other European multilateral 
organisations for the specific common policy spaces.   
                                                             
∗ Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This Policy Brief is also 
available in Russian translation from the CEPS website. A more general view of Wider Europe policy, as 
opposed the institutional angle in the present paper, is available in the author’s CEPS Policy Brief No 39, The 
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1.  Wider Europe enters on stage 
As the ink has been drying this year on the 12 new Treaties of Accession to the European 
Union, the term ‘Wider Europe’ has swiftly entered into the discourse of European foreign 
ministers and the European institutions (with ‘New Neighbours’ and ‘Proximity Policy’ being 
used as alternative terms). No coincidence of course. Every enlargement has led to new 
developments in the EU’s external policies. But this one is arguably the most important to 
date, since it confronts the question if not of the EU’s final frontiers, at least of how the EU 
of 25, or 27 (plus Bulgaria and Romania) or possibly 30 (with Turkey, Croatia and Norway) 
will relate to the rest of Europe and its wider neighbourhood. 
The topic is of strategic importance for the European Union, and also for Russia as the major 
non-EU actor on the European stage. The subject has been opened up by two documents from 
the European Commission,
1 complemented by Solana’s security strategy documents 
(preliminary version of June,
2 final version forthcoming in December). The European 
Parliament now finalises its report on the same subject.
3  
But the content so far on offer from the EU is very thin, and focuses mostly on a little more 
hub-and-spoke bilateralism towards Ukraine and Moldova. The responsibility is given the 
Commissioner for enlargement, suggesting indeed that the main idea is some kind of faint 
derivative of accession negotiations. The Wider Europe initiative risks being a flop unless it 
is given more Wider European policy content and a credible institutional backup. But a flop 
would be more than a non-event, for two reasons.  
First, it would risk boosting some worrying dynamics in the new Europe, namely the 
increasing polarisation between the two bilateral hub-and-spoke systems of the EU and 
Russia, as opposed to deepening the common European policy space. This would mean an 
increasingly tense EU-Russian relationship with respect to their interests in their overlapping 
near abroads. Symptomatic of these tensions are the contradictions between the EU-Russian 
endeavours to create a Common European Economic Space and the recent announcement by 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to form a Single Economic Space, while Ukraine is 
looking for a signal from the EU concerning its prospects for ultimate EU membership. 
Another example is seen in Moldova, where there is new EU interest in helping find a 
solution to the Transniestria problem. Moldova wants to join the South East European 
integration train, but Russia so far resists the EU coming seriously into the Transniestria 
                                                             
1 European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003)104 final, 11.3.2003; and Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood 
Instrument, COM(2003)393 final, 1 July 2003. 
2 Securing Europe in a Better World, document submitted by J. Solana to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 
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affair. Both of these situations, from trade policy to conflict resolution, cry out for 
cooperative European solutions involving the EU, Russia and the states that lie between. 
Second, it would mean failing to realise the EU’s unique potential for aiding the process of 
conflict resolution in the European South Eastern periphery, from the Balkans to the 
Caucasus. The EU’s unique tool is the modern process of ‘Europeanisation’ beyond the states 
that are actively negotiating accession. By this one may mean that the force of the incentives 
coming from the EU to transform the former communist and fascist states of Europe in terms 
of common European values and standards would be ineffective beyond the accession 
process. The Wider Europe should be precisely about extending Europeanisation beyond the 
accession process, rather than a symbolic diplomatic gesture to the excluded.  
2.  Organisation of common European policy spaces 
How to give substance to the Wider Europe slogan? The answer has to lie in a) the definition 
of the territories to be covered, b) identification of the policy areas of common European 
interest and c) the institutional shape of their multilateral organisation (in addition to their 
inevitable bilateral content). 
On the geographical extent of the Wider Europe, the obvious model is the membership map 
of the Council of Europe, since this covers all of what is uncontroversially ‘Europe’, all of 
these states having subscribed to common fundamental political values and norms.
4 This 
would correct for the Commission document’s much criticised exclusion of the South 
Caucasus states from the Wider Europe.  
The Mediterranean states of the Barcelona process are also covered in the Commission’s 
Wider Europe document. But the agenda for the Arab world and the Greater Middle East is 
quite different from that for the Wider Europe (of Council of Europe membership). The 
Mediterranean and Greater Middle East are of the highest priority for the EU’s foreign and 
security policies, but should continue to be handled in the existing institutional framework, 
i.e. the Barcelona process, the Gulf Cooperation Council, etc. These regions are also prime 
subjects of Solana’s European Security Strategy documents. Both the Wider Europe (of 
Council of Europe membership) and the Greater Middle East are strategic EU interests, but 
they are different businesses.  
Yet these two vast geo-political regions should not be rigidly segmented by EU policy. In 
particular, some countries of the South and Eastern Mediterranean may be willing and able to 
associate closely with European values in due course. While the Commission’s document of 
March was too superficial and sweeping in saying simply that all the Mediterranean countries 
of the Barcelona process should be part of the Wider Europe initiative, it should not go to the 
other extreme either with a message of ethno-cultural discrimination. If some countries of the 
Mediterranean want to make a serious commitment to European values, the Council of 
Europe could open its door to associate membership for such countries, and maybe in due 
course full membership. Israel and the future Palestinian state could be candidates after 
resolution of the conflict (before which Israeli democracy would hardly qualify). Of the Arab 
states of North Africa, for example, perhaps Morocco might become the first to approach 
Council of Europe standards at some stage, in which case they should be given every 
encouragement. 
On the common European policy ‘areas’ or ‘spaces’, the last EU-Russian summits in May 
2003 actually agreed to a list of no less than five, to which two more need to be added to be 
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systemically complete. The seven common European policy areas may be conventionally 
grouped under three broad dimensions – political, economic and security – but to be tractable 
operationally, a breakdown into the seven areas is needed.
5 See Box 1. 
Box 1. The seven common European policy areas 
Political and human dimension 
1. Democracy and human rights 
2. Education, culture and research 
Economic dimension 
3. Trade and market  
4. Monetary  
5. Infrastructure and network 
Security dimension 
6. Justice and internal security 
7. External security 
The institutional aspect is almost wholly lacking so far in the official documents, bar token 
remarks about using the existing multilateral bodies. Yet this is what is critically needed to 
give credibility and a creative organisational structure to the Wider Europe initiative. It also 
fits perfectly with the EU’s very official doctrine favouring a global multilateral order, which 
is eloquently expressed at the UN in New York with the US policy as target, but which has 
not always been so evident in the past from the sometimes rather condescending attitudes 
expressed towards the ‘lesser’ European organisations.  
The overarching structure could start with an upgrading of the so-called European 
Conference (the periodic meetings between the EU and most other European states), which 
should be more meaningfully renamed as the Pan-European (or Common European) 
Conference. This forum should be opened to all Council of Europe member states.
6 Core 
structures are required, however, if this is not to resemble the UN General Assembly without 
the UN Security Council. Moreover, the Council of Europe and the OSCE themselves also 
need core structures if they are to be more relevant for a Europe with an EU of 25 and more 
member states.   
The Pan-European Conference would have a Coordinating Group consisting of the EU 
(future foreign minister), Russia and two rotating places for non-EU member states. One 
could discuss whether this Coordinating Group should have Turkey and Ukraine as 
permanent members. (They might prefer not to have this status, since they could consider 
                                                             
5 All these spaces have been advocated by the EU and Russia at summit level together, except the Democracy 
and Human Rights Area (presumably because of the shadow of Chechnya for Russia, and institutional 
complications on the EU side for the monetary area). 
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Committee of Ministers, the occasions of these meetings could also be used for Council of Europe decision-
making purposes, the ministers changing their hats for this purpose without additional meetings, which would 
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being grouped with Russia in this way as a risk in terms of their EU ambitions, and we 
therefore leave this issue in parenthesis.) The Coordinating Group would prepare meetings of 
the full conference, but not have decision-making powers. In this respect there would not be 
the jump to a full analogy with the UN Security Council, although Russia has pushed for 
something like this in relation to the OSCE.  
The Pan-European Coordinating Group would also supervise the work of separate 
coordinating groups for each of the seven common policy spaces, which would be structured 
in the same way with the EU and Russia as permanent members and two rotating places. But 
to each of these sectoral coordinating groups would be added the relevant specialised 
institutions:  
•  the Council of Europe for the two areas of the political and human dimension;
7  
•  the EEA/EFTA Surveillance Authority and OECD for the trade and market area;  
•  the European Central bank for the monetary area;  
•  the Pan-European Conference of Transport Ministers, the Energy Charter, the EIB 
and EBRD for the infrastructure and network area;  
•  Europol for the justice and internal security area; and  
•  NATO and the OSCE for the external security area.  
These coordinating groups would facilitate the exchanges between the Pan-European 
Conference and the sectoral organisations, and so help give coherence, synergies and impetus 
to the overall Wider Europe initiative. The EU institutions should take the initiative in 
submitting Green Papers on the each of the policy domains, to be followed no doubt by 
proposals from Russia and other states of the Wider Europe.    
3.  Place of the EU in the Wider European organisations 
The final institutional development would concern the place of the EU in the European 
multilateral organisations, and notably the Council of Europe, OSCE and OECD. The EU 
would accede as full member of these organisations following the model already established 
for certain UN agencies, replacing the existing ad hoc arrangements.
8 The EU (foreign 
minister or his representative) would have full rights in these organisations, with the proviso 
of ‘no additionality’ for voting rights. This means that where an issue would come to the 
vote, the EU and its member states decide themselves whether this is a matter for a collective 
EU position, or individual member states. In the former case the EU representative casts a 
single vote with a weight of 15 (or 25, etc.), and the member states do not vote. In the latter 
case the EU representative does not vote.
9 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
has recently published proposals for a strengthened institutional linkage with the EU, which 
await an EU response.
10 
                                                             
7 The EU already has regular Quadripartite meetings with the Council of Europe (EU Council and Commission, 
Council of Europe Chairman in Office and Secretary General), and this has become a useful development.  
8 A recent Commission Communication surveys the relationship between the EU and the entire UN system in 
considerable detail, but concentrates on the principles of multilateralism and the modalities of more effective 
coordination rather than institutional innovations. See “The European Union and the United Nations – the 
choice of multilateralism”, COM(2003)536, 10 September 2003.  
9 This is basically the model established for the EU’s participation in the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) of the UN, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
10 “A Europe of partners – Towards an associate partnership between the Council of Europe and the European 
Union”, Memorandum by the Secretary General, information document SG/Inf(2003)35, 25 September 2003, 
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The Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD would themselves form similar 
coordinating groups for their own purposes, as well as that of preparing positions for the Pan-
European Conference. The Council of Europe coordinating group would consist of the 
Secretary General, the Chairman in Office, the EU, Russia and two rotating places for the 
non-EU countries. The OSCE coordinating group would have the same format, but would 
also include the US in view of its full membership of that organisation. The OECD 
coordinating group would today include the US and Japan, with Russia to be added later as 
and when it accedes to this organisation.  
In this way, combined with the rest of the Wider Europe structure, these valuable 
organisations would be rescued from their increasingly grave institutional obsolescence. But 
the more fundamental point is that the Wider Europe would be given an institutional structure 
that matches up to the level of this strategic concept. Europe has been searching for over a 
decade now for the formula for its post-Communist, post-Soviet, and enlarging EU era. Here 
it is. 
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